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Implementing Risk Adjusted
Capitation Payments with Health Care Reforms
in Hungary
Since the late nineties Hungarian governments have been considering the introduction of new health care 
arrangements by establishing organizations with devolved responsibilities for the management of health 
care. These organizations are typically financed through a weighted (risk adjusted) capitation system 
which is regarded as an adequate and optimal tool for resource allocation purposes. Through capitation 
one needs to handle large inequities in the Hungarian health care system and keep an eye on the incentives 
for efficiency. For the capitation formula a relatively broad choice of risk adjusters are available in the form 
of pharmacy- and diagnosis-based patient level utilization data (health-based adjusters) and area level 
socio-economic data (non health-based adjusters). The instant application of health-based adjusters 
has limitations because they reflect a distorted provider structure and offer perverse incentives; therefore 
a gradual shift from using non health-based adjusters to health-based adjusters is preferred. The early 
phase of the capitation system also implies a strong presence of risk sharing arrangements and other 
complementary policies. Given that promoting efficiency and equity are to be pursued, the capitation 
approach outlined in this paper should serve as a guide to future Hungarian health care system reforms.
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Introduction
Many eorts to reform health funding and the delivery of health care arise from concerns 
about cost escalation, which is a well-known policy concern in the majority of developed 
countries (Segal et al 2002, Rice and Smith 2001).A common element in these health 
care reforms is the application of prospective payments, because this method allows the 
application of rigorous budget constraints. Prospective budgets allocated to health care 
organizations with devolved responsibilities are oen set by capitation formula (Milgrom 
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and Roberts 1990, Rice and Smith 2002). Capitation can be dened as the amount of health 
service funds to be assigned to a person with certain characteristics for the service in 
question, for the time period in question, subject to any budget constraints (Smith 1999). In 
eect, a capitation puts a “price” on the head of every citizen, which represents (in an ideal 
world) an unbiased estimate of the expected costs of the citizen. e crucial element of 
capitation payments is the calculation of expected expenditures depending on individuals’ 
personal characteristics; a process oen referred to as risk adjustment. is method has 
been the focus of several studies over the last 15 years1. However the success of capitation 
depends not only on the integrity of risk adjustment methods but also on the context in 
which the formula is applied (Peacock and Segal 2000). us both the methodological and 
policy concerns of the capitation technique should be considered. 
In the last 15 years Hungary has shown a considerable interest in prospective 
budget setting in health care and applied it as an important policy instrument for cost 
containment. Prospective nancing techniques were introduced in the nineties to various 
health care services, including in-patient care, ambulatory care and diagnostic services. 
Simple capitation approaches with little scientic emphasis have also been applied for the 
remuneration of primary care physicians and managed care pilot organizations. Health 
care reforms in the last decade, while leaving most of the provider nancing methods 
untouched, direct attention towards the application of the capitation approach in order 
to promote a nationwide strategic resource allocation. is paper examines the challenges 
and diculties Hungary has to encounter when setting capitation budgets for nancially 
responsible devolved health care organizations and demonstrates the possibilities and 
opportunities a country has to deal with, in order to secure important resource allocation 
goals, such as equity and eciency. e question addressed here is, given the Hungarian 
health care environment, the declared resource allocation goals and the instruments 
available, what capitation methodology best serves our purposes? To answer this we rst 
discuss the basic characteristics of the Hungarian health care system and the reforms that 
have been considered for implementation; then we move towards the application of risk 
adjustment in this system and the complementary policies to be set along with capitation 
before nally examining the criteria of application and drawing conclusions. 
System Characteristics 
Current Health Care Funding and Delivery
e health care system in Hungary is funded through a national health insurance scheme that 
requires mandatory participation and provides universal coverage for every citizen. Health 
care is principally funded through taxes and income related health care contributions that 
cover 70.9 % of total health care expenditures, while 29.1% is paid out of pocket or from other 
sources (OECD 2008). Services are delivered predominantly by local government owned 
public providers who contract with the single nationwide insurance institution (National 
Health Insurance Fund Administration, NHIFA). Local governments are responsible for 
1 E.g. see special issues of Health Care Management Science, Medical Care, Health Policy, Health Care Financing Review, 
Inquiry, and reviews by Van de Ven W and Ellis R (2000) and Rice and Smith (2001)
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ensuring health care coverage – municipalities are responsible for primary care (e.g. family 
practitioners), while county governments are responsible for secondary health care services 
(e.g. hospitals). Health care providers are directly nanced by NHIFA through 20 centrally 
dened sub-budgets, largely with performance based payment mechanisms (i.e. diagnosis-
related groups; point-for-service system). e ownership of health care providers is mostly 
under public control with the exception of family practices, pharmacies, kidney dialysis 
and some diagnostic services. In sum, the funding, organizing and providing of health care 
is more or less dominated by the public sector with a slowly increasing role of private and 
not-for-prot participants.
Health Care Reforms and Devolved Organizations
Several reforms have been introduced to improve the Hungarian health care system since 
the early 1990s. Achievements so far have been mixed, and there has long been agreement 
that further improvement is required. Since 1998 health care reforms have been attempting 
to enhance the eciency of the system by the introduction of devolved organizations that 
arrange health care services for the population in their jurisdiction. ese eorts comprise 
(i) the establishment of managed care organizations inspired by the British fundholding and 
the US HMO2 systems (Mihályi 2003b,Nagy and Dózsa 2002), (ii) the introduction and the 
rejection of a competition based health care co-ordinating model built upon sickness funds 
with private involvement (between February 2008 and May 2008) (Nagy et al 2008,Magyar 
Közlöny 2008, EÜM 2007)and (iii) various proposals for setting up geographically dened, 
non-competing, publicly owned health care delivery schemes (EÜM 2004, Sinkó 2008). A 
common element of these arrangements has been to devolve responsibility for organizing 
health care to purchasers (oen referred as health plans) that promote the ecient delivery 
of health care. At the same time, the principle of solidarity (equity) has remained a prime 
goal of the Hungarian health care system and this has been constantly supported by the 
strong presence of public funding and delivery.
Funding Arrangements
An important characteristic of the proposed health care arrangements is that the devolved 
organizations are nanced through a weighted capitation system. Figure 1 shows the typical 
ow of payments in the proposed health care arrangements. Health plans are nanced by 
NHIFA through capitation while the – direct or indirect – nancing of the providers is 
taken over by the devolved organizations. e capitation payment covers the majority of 
the publicly nanced in-kind benets, including e.g. primary care, outpatient specialist 
care, dialysis, computer tomography (CT), magnetic resonance and imaging (MRI), home 
care, inpatient services and medicine subsidies. Health care services that are not covered by 
the capitation scheme (e.g. catastrophic interventions, experimental treatments, implants, 
pharmaceuticals distributed under special rationing) typically remain nanced by NHIFA 
and reimbursed from a national risk pooling fund (see Figure 1). In all schemes the 
dominance of capitation nancing has been essential: for example in the latest known – 
2 HMO: Health Maintenance Organization, the most prevalent type of managed care organization that provides a form 
of health care coverage through contracted hospitals, doctors, and other providers in the United States.
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February 2008 – reform proposals, 91 % of in-kind benets were planned to be nanced 
by capitation (Table 1). is indicates a crucial role for this type of nancing method in 
cases where the Hungarian government considers health care arrangements for devolved 
organizations. 
It is important to note, however, that while there are many other areas of application 
for the capitation method (e.g. reimbursement of providers, allocation of capital resources) 
this paper focuses on setting capitation by NHIFA (sponsor) for devolved organizations 
(health plans) (see Figure 1). is process is oen referred to as strategic resource allocation 
(Rice and Smith 2002) and its implementation is regarded as one of the most prominent 
issues of health care planning in the majority of developed countries.
Figure 1 
e typical ow of payments in health care schemes for devolved organizations, 
proposed by recent Hungarian health care reforms
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Table 1 
Main categories of Health Insurance Fund expenditures projected in 2007, split 
according to the February 2008 reform proposals
In-kind benets covered by the capitation scheme
Curative and preventive services
Total current 
expenditures 
(billion EUR)
Per capita 
expenditures 
(EUR)
Family doctor services 244 24,0
Dental care 79 7,8
Chronic care 38 3,7
Patient transfer 25 2,5
Kidney dialysis 82 8,1
Home care 15 1,4
Laboratory diagnostics 78 7,7
Outpatient specialist care 362 35,6
CT, MRI 49 4,8
Inpatient services 1 544 151,7
Balneotherapy 23 2,3
Medicines subsidy 1 435 140,9
Medical aids subsidy 139 13,7
Total benets covered by the capitation scheme 4 113 404,0
In-kind benets not covered by the capitation scheme
Mother and child health services 77 7,6
Ad hoc medicine subsidy 17 1,6
Transport subsidy 28 2,7
Emergency care units 75 7,4
Treatments under special rationing regimes, implants 76 7,4
Other in-kind benets 116 11,4
Total benets not covered by the capitation scheme 389 38,2
Cash benets 900 3,6
Administration 1 236 4,9
Total public health care expenditures 6 636 26,4
Note: 1 Euro = 250.93 HUF
Source: National Health Insurance Fund Administration, 2007, Nagy et al 2007, Magyar Közlöny 2008
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Relevance of Capitation 
Capitation payment should address both the goal of a more ecient and a more equitable 
resource allocation in Hungary. ese goals will be considered in turn.
Eciency of Resource Allocation and Risk Selection
One motive behind implementing capitation is to secure control of expenditures which is 
a macroeconomic eciency concern. Strict budget constraints imposed by the capitation 
method strongly support the cost containment eorts and the rigorous budget planning 
process that have been exercised in the last two decades by respective Hungarian governments. 
Secondly, the ecient allocation across various health care provisions can also be supported 
by the capitation method. In the Hungarian system providers are nanced directly by the 
NHIFA through a system of isolated sub-funds. In contrast, under the capitation scheme 
money ows are no longer earmarked; health care organizations have the choice to develop 
an optimal blend of services for their population and allocate resources accordingly. 
Further eciency objectives are also implicit in the sense that capitation seeks to 
make purchasers and providers more responsive to issues of the costs and benets of 
their actions. is, on the one hand encourages health plans to operate eciently; on the 
other it increases non intended risk selection behaviour. Risk selection usually becomes 
a problem when health plans are not compensated for their high risk/high cost enrolees. 
When capitation based budgets are not accurate (or generous) enough to cover current 
expenditures, health plans will attempt to “cherry-pick” the less costly population (if 
they have the chance) or promote other non intended behaviours (e.g. quality skimping, 
underproviding). ese activities certainly undermine the eciency of the health care 
market, and it is desirable they should be prevented through adjusting for the predictable 
expenditures of the population in the capitation scheme (van den Ven and Ellis 2000). In 
that respect an accurate capitation formula has a role in ensuring the awless operation of 
the health care market through reducing incentives to risk selection. 
Equity of Resource Allocation 
e application of capitation payment to the proposed health care delivery schemes has 
another strategic role in Hungary. Securing equity, dened as providing equal access to 
health care according to equal needs,3 has been declared a cornerstone of Hungarian health 
care reforms for many decades. ere has always been a high priority attached to this 
notion; however its operationalisation has not been very successful. e population’s needs 
across dierent regions is not particularly reected in the health care provider structure: 
in certain areas people have better access to health care than in other areas. is dierence 
is particularly apparent between rural and urban areas (Orosz 2001,Mihályi 2003a, Goglio
2005), and as a result the allocation of health care resources is regarded as inequitable in 
many aspects in Hungary (Takács et al 2006, Boncz et al 2006, Szaszkó et al 2006). Even if the 
observed dierences relate not only to health status, but to social, economic, demographic, 
housing, educational and other circumstances, they can to some extent be addressed by 
3 This definition of equity is often referred to as horizontal equity in the health economic literature.
Implementing risk adjusted capitation payments with health care reforms in Hungary 153
the development of the health care delivery system. erefore it is imperative to adjust for 
these existing inequalities when designing a resource allocation scheme. In order to put 
this into eect appropriate measures of health need to be incorporated in the capitation 
payment formula that are independent of current provision and are capable of reecting the 
population’s dierent levels of health care need. Nevertheless it is important to bear in mind 
that a well designed capitation formula in itself cannot solve all problems of inequality 
within the Hungarian health system.  
Role of Risk Adjustment
As explained above, both the promotion of equity and eciency have to be considered 
in the design of the capitation formula. ere is a wide consensus in the health economic 
literature that the best way to account for both goals is the risk adjustment method (Rice 
and Smith 2001, van den Ven and Ellis 2000, Newhouse 1998). We dene risk adjustment 
as the use of information to calculate the expected health expenditures of individuals over 
a xed interval of time and to set capitation payments to health plans in order to improve 
eciency and equity. We discuss the applicability of risk adjusters in Hungary under two 
broad categories: (a) health-based adjusters and (b) non health-based adjusters; within non 
health-based adjusters we discuss demographic adjusters (age and gender) separately. 
Risk Adjustment Methods
Age and Gender Based Risk Adjustment
Demographic information for risk adjustment is usually accessible, valid and veriable in 
many countries. Capitation models that incorporate information on age and gender are used 
in the majority of the risk adjustment models (Rice and Smith 2001), although demographic 
models have weak power to predict future costs and their capability of reecting health care 
needs or future health care consumption is very limited (van den Ven and Ellis 2000). In spite 
of their poor statistical performance they still prove a legitimate reection of health care 
needs on condition that their eect on resource allocation has been thoroughly scrutinized 
before application.
A recent analysis of the application of the demographic formula in Hungary showed 
similarities with international experience: the age and gender based model explains only a 
small percentage of the variance of health care expenditures (R2=0.0457 (Nagy et al 2003)).
It has also been suggested that the demographic formula results in a serious reallocation 
of resources across regions (Nagy et al 2007). Figure 2 shows how total payments change 
by counties (megye) when resources were allocated by the demographic formula.4 Some 
regions show more than 10% divergence from the current public health care expenditures. 
In contrast, the population’s health status (measured by potential years of life lost to age 
70) presents a very dissimilar distribution. Health status compared to either current 
4 In Figure 2 current public health care expenditure figures represent the majority (91%) of in-kind benefits financed by 
the NHIFA; health care expenditures are linked to the insurees’ place of residence (not to the point of service); see more 
details on this analysis in the paper of  Nagy et al (2007).
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expenditures or the demographic allocations indicates that there is very little in common 
across the current allocation of health care resources, the allocation suggested by the 
demographic formula and health care needs (measured by potential years of life lost to age 
70). It would, therefore, seem essential that any formula goes beyond these easily available 
data to reect dierences in health need more faithfully.
Figure 2 
Resource allocations in Hungary projected by age and gender compared to 
current public health care expenditures (2006) and potential years of life lost to age 70
Note: potential years of life lost to age 70 = potential years of life lost to age 70 per 100,000 citizens
Source: based on Nagy et al 2007.
Health-based Risk Adjusters 
An extensive international literature indicates that adjusters directly measuring health 
status (health-based adjusters) receive top priority when designing risk adjusted capitation 
payments. e starting point for most of the health-based models is the concept that certain 
diagnoses and/or the prior use of medications indicate the presence of chronic conditions 
and predict future expenditures with reasonable accuracy (R2≈0.15-0.20)5. Health-based 
models have been developed - particularly in the US - and some of them have been adopted 
in Europe, such as pharmacy- (Lamers and van Vliet 2004, Zhao et al 2005, Sales et al 2003,
5 See the latter references on these values in this paragraph.
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Fishman et al 2003, Gilmer et al 2001), ambulatory- (Weiner et al 1996, Welch 2002), and 
in-patient (Ellis et al 1996, Ash et al 2000, Kronick et al 1996, Antioch and Walsh 2002) care 
models as well as combined information models to identify the cost of patients.
Hungary certainly has the option of pursuing this route, as a particularly rich patient 
level dataset is available for the majority of health care provision; however, there are 
limitations to instant application. First, we cannot dismiss the fact that health care utilization 
data have the potential to present incentives to data manipulation or could lead to provider 
misbehaviour and other non-intended responses by the devolved organizations. ese 
issues have rarely been satisfactory addressed in the literature (Lamers and Vliet 2003, Ellis
2002). Another diculty is that utilization data, particularly in Hungary, oen reect a 
distorted provider structure (see Figure 2). erefore variations in spending may not only 
be due to variations in individual needs (legitimate factors) but also to variations in the 
supply of services (illegitimate factors). Without the elimination of these factors the health-
based formula would reect utilization patterns rather than real health care needs.
ere has been some experience in Hungary concerning the application of health-
based adjusters. In 2002 the demographic model of the experimental managed care 
program (Mihályi 2003b) was extended by one health-based risk adjuster so that patients 
with chronic dialysis treatment received extra compensation in the capitation payment 
scheme (Nagy et al 2003,Nagy et al 2005b). It was suggested that this risk adjuster presented 
a good reection of health care needs and that it was not distorted by illegitimate supply 
signs (Nagy et al 2005a). It is important to bear in mind that the case of dialysis treatment 
might be one of the rare examples; health-based variables that are derived from utilization 
data will need very cautious implementation.
Non Health-based Risk Adjusters
Risk adjusters that do not rely directly on health status (non health-based adjusters) usually 
comprise employment/disability status, geographical location, social factors and other 
measures. Despite the fact that these variables have a less direct relationship with health care 
needs, the rationale behind their use is that they are less vulnerable to data manipulation, 
oen permit access to rich aggregate data sources  and have the potential to allow for those 
elements of need that cannot be captured by health-based adjusters (Smith et al 2001).
In Hungary, to our knowledge, the vast majority of the data on non health-based 
adjusters is available only at an aggregate level. Small geographical units (173 small areas) 
with a population size of 7,000–250,000 people provide measures on various social, 
economic, cultural, educational, infrastructural and employment factors; these data are 
routinely collected by the Hungarian Central Statistician Oce. An important limitation 
of the use of such aggregate data is the phenomenon referred as the ecological fallacy: 
the possibility of identifying a relationship between a potential risk adjuster and health 
care expenditures at the aggregate level that does not hold at the individual level (Selvin
1958). e potential for ecological fallacy seriously undermines the practical applicability 
of aggregate data; however their use, given the lack of individual level data, oen seems 
inevitable. ere is also a common feeling among decision makers that socio-economic 
variables (even on the aggregate level) reect populations’ health care needs better than 
individual level health care utilisation data. erefore non health-based adjustment should 
be regarded as an important technique to consider for the improvement of the formula.
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A Hybrid Model of Risk Adjustment
Hungary can be viewed as a country that has a relatively broad choice of risk adjusters 
and therefore various options to pursue. erefore a hybrid capitation model is suggested 
that embodies dierent types of adjusters and compromises between the theoretically best 
performing but potentially biased health-based adjusters and the less accurate but more 
credible non health-based adjusters. An attainable model development scenario might be 
to:
introduce demographic adjusters (age and sex) x
develop non health-based adjusters (e.g. social, economic, cultural, educational, x
infrastructural and employment factors)
add simple measures of chronic health conditions – at rst those that are easily x
determined and not likely to suer from distortion eects (e.g. based on data on 
patients on chronic dialysis treatment)
introduce complex health-based models, but only on condition that the system is able x
to control supply side eects (illegitimate adjusters and perverse incentives).
ere is probably a long way to go to get to this nal model and it is important to see 
that the introduction of risk adjusters is only one element of the capitation scheme 
which needs to be followed by various complementary policies. 
Complementary Policies
Risk adjustment is usually blended with complementary strategies; risk sharing is regarded 
as the most common element of capitation schemes. 
Risk Sharing
Risk sharing implies that health plans are retrospectively reimbursed for some of the 
expenditures of some of their members. Although risk sharing eectively reduces 
organizations’ incentive for risk selection, it also reduces their incentive for eciency (van 
Barnevald et al 2001). If health plans know that they will be retrospectively reimbursed 
for some of their decits, risk sharing may serve as a disincentive to operate eciently. 
is is in sharp contrast to risk adjustment that introduces incentives to operate eciently 
(Newhouse 1998). erefore risk sharing is usually considered as the “second best” strategy 
that follows risk adjustment. 
ere are several ways of risk sharing; however the exact method is usually the 
subject not only of scientic questions but political, ethical and social judgments. Under 
“proportional risk sharing” a certain fraction of expenditures are shared. Another method 
is “outlier risk sharing” where all expenditures above a certain threshold are reimbursed. 
With “risk sharing for high risks”, health plans are free to select a certain percentage of 
their members for whom some risk is shared. “Condition specic risk sharing” implies that 
members with certain medical conditions are selected to have their costs shared (van den 
Ven and Ellis 2000).
In Hungary, especially at the early stage of implementation, risk sharing as a 
complementary strategy is expected to have a dominant role. ere are two arguments 
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for this: (1) the early capitation payment formula (e.g. based on age and gender) is not 
expected to accurately compensate health plans for their high risk members and this would 
introduce incentives for selection; (2) as demonstrated in Figure 2 the reallocation eect 
of any payment formula (even a perfect one) would be too large in comparison to current 
health spending (see Figure 2) and such reallocation across regions would threaten health 
care delivery. e February 2008 health care reform plans set out a high level of proportional 
risk sharing: 80% of sickness funds’ (health plans) costs were to be reimbursed on the basis 
of their current expenditures. is is in line with the international experience that suggests 
a relatively large proportion of risk sharing at the launch of immature capitation systems. 
For example in the Netherlands in certain services 70%-95% of sickness funds’ costs, and 
in Belgium 90% of costs, were reimbursed in the early phase of the capitation system 
(Schokkaert and Van de Voorde 2003, Lamers et al 2003)
Timing and Mixture of Policies
Capitation schemes are usually phased in with great caution. e key element is certainly the 
evolution of the risk adjustment formula; mainly because it is the most helpful in achieving 
resource allocation goals (equity and eciency) and also because it directly aects all the 
other policies applied with the capitation payment scheme. e accuracy of the formula 
strongly determines to what extent risk sharing mechanisms should be applied. Similarly, the 
new risk adjusters in the formula dene the provider control mechanisms to be introduced. 
e formula development should be balanced between two basic requirements. On the 
one hand the formula should be moving towards the populations’ anticipated health care 
needs – a requirement of equitable resource allocation. On the other hand the devolved 
organizations should be compensated for their high risk members so that there remains 
little incentive for risk selection – an argument for ecient resource allocation. At present 
the equity argument has a priority, although international experience suggests that where 
regulated (sickness fund) competition is present selection becomes the leading edge in the 
long run (Van de Ven W et al 2007). A persistent tension is also expected between the 
technical accuracy of the formulae - which promotes eciency and equity – and the desire 
for simplicity – which promotes political accountability (Sheldon 1997); this tension usually 
slows down the formula development process. As a result, the complete process of dening 
a funding formula that meets the designated resource allocation goals and that successfully 
comprises risk adjustment, risk sharing and other complementary policies is expected to 
take a minimum of 5-10 years. Future research should primarily focus on the exact method 
of risk adjustment to which all other capitation policies adjust. Hungary is just about to 
take the rst steps on the path that the Netherlands, England, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, 
the United States and many other countries have been following for decades. ere is no 
question about the diculties Hungary will have to face, but based on these countries’ 
experiences we believe that many of their problems can be circumvented in future. 
Concluding Remarks
e broad challenge faced by Hungary is to adopt a new health care system approach to 
improving the performance of the health care sector while preserving historically strong 
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principles of equity. is has been considered in various health reform proposals in which 
devolved health care delivery schemes are implemented and the allocation of resources 
is carried out through the capitation payment mechanism. Capitation based resource 
allocation faces two broad challenges. Firstly, there are large inequities in the access to 
health care delivery that need correction. Secondly, although eciency is encouraged by 
the budget constraints imposed by capitation, risk selection is also threatened. erefore 
capitation methodology has an important role in securing equal access for equal needs 
and in preventing incentives for risk selection. To achieve these goals the improvement of 
the capitation payment scheme with the risk adjustment method is recommended in the 
rst place where a blend of health-based and non health-based adjusters are foreseen. Risk 
sharing elements are secondary, although they may have a dominant role during the early 
implementation of the capitation payment system. irdly, a relatively long transitional 
period with gradual implementation and an adequate balance of complementary policies 
are suggested. ese elements together, secure a sustainable, accountable and acceptable 
playing eld to all actors in the prospective Hungarian health care system. 
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